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Confidence (n) 1: faith, trust
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1980)
I have a nest egg. At least, I believe I have a nest egg. I
believe this because each quarter, I receive statements in the
mail that assert that I own shares in several corporations and
that these shares have value. I do not know where or how these
statements were generated, nor do I know who created them or
through whose hands they have passed. I have never seen the
stock certificates my financial statements assure me I own,
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much less the corporate assets that underlie those stock
certificates and give them value. I have never met the
corporate officers and directors who are supposed to protect
those assets and manage them on my behalf. In fact, for all I
know my investments do not exist, and the statements I receive
are created by a rogue broker on his personal computer. (If this
scenario seems unrealistic, recall the Lehman Brothers broker
who recently bilked investors of $125 million using just such a
strategy.)'
Nevertheless, despite my lack of hard evidence or
personal knowledge, I believe I have a nest egg. What's more, I
rely on my belief in making daily decisions. I go out to dinner,
the opera and the ball game, spending money now because I
believe my nest egg will provide for my retirement in the
future. This is an act of faith. It is an act of trust. It is an act of
investor confidence.
My thesis is that my investing behavior is not unusual.
To the contrary, many investors behave as I do. What's more,
we should be grateful they do. Investor trust provides the
foundation on which the American securities market has been
built. Without investor trust, our market would be a thin
shadow of its present self. Suspicious and distrustful investors
would refuse to exchange their hard-earned cash for such
abstract and intangible goods as corporate securities. Instead,
they would put their savings into tangible assets like gold or
real estate, or under their mattresses.
The importance of investor trust to the success of
securities markets is, of course, something that many
experienced policymakers and businesspeople have always
recognized. Recent events, however, have highlighted the
significance of investor trust in a fashion we have not seen
since the 1930s. Over the last year, the American investor has
been drowned in a seemingly relentless flood of announcements
of accounting frauds and other irregularities at some of the
nation's largest corporations.2 In the wake of these scandals
(and the stock price declines accompanying them), there has
been much talk among regulators and business leaders of the
importance of maintaining investor confidence in the market.
' See Charles Gasparino & Susanne Craig, Fugitive Stock Broker Is In
Custody, Gruttadauria Turns Himself In, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at C1.
2 See infra text and notes 16-20, 32 (describing scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, Xerox, Global Crossing and others).
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Many commentators have also expressed fear that confidence is
eroding.3
Yet, the phenomenon of investor confidence has received
remarkably little detailed investigation by the academics who
study the markets.4 I would like to use the occasion of the
Ninth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture to begin to fill
that gap. Recent events have underscored the importance of
understanding the nature of investor confidence. In particular,
they have highlighted the importance of understanding how
investor confidence may be cultivated-and how it may be
destroyed.
I. TwO MODELS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR
I begin with a basic question: why do investors invest?
The answer seems obvious enough on first inspection. Investors
invest because they expect to make money. But now one must
confront another question that is quite a bit more difficult to
answer. Why do investors believe they will make money by
purchasing corporate securities? Why don't they believe,
instead, that if they purchase corporate securities their money
will be stolen or squandered by unscrupulous corporate
3 See, e.g., Nanette Byrnes, Five Ways to Avoid More Enrons, BUS. WK., Feb.
18, 2002, at 36 (quoting CEO of Bethlehem Steel Corp. that 'capitalism depends on
investor confidence" and "that confidence has been brought into question"); Daniel
Kadlec, Eight Remedies, TIME, June 17, 2002, at 51 (noting that "[t]he deepening
erosion of investor trust" has moved the New York Stock Exchange to propose
governance reforms); Mary Ellen Lloyd, Questioning the Books: Krispy Kreme Takes
Steps to Increase Investor Confidence, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2002, at A4 (describing how
CEO of Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc. has begun governance reforms to reinforce
investor confidence following the Enron scandal); Burton G. Malkiel, The Market Can
Police Itself, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2002, at A10 (stating opinion of leading economist
that "[i]nvesting is an act of faith .... There is no doubt that this faith has been
shattered and is urgently in need of repair"); Getting Investors to Trust Again, BUS.
WK., Mar. 4, 2002, at 120 (opining that "to restore investor trust, corporate executives,
regulators, and legislators should act fast" and that "if Corporate America fails to
reform itself quickly, investors could go on an all-out strike against stocks"); The Tyco
Market, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A20 (suggesting in an editorial by a leading
financial newspaper that "falnyone who still doubts that markets operate on trust
might want to inspect yesterday's carnage on Wall Street").
President George W. Bush has recently added his voice to the swelling
chorus. See Jeanne Cummings, Bush to Seek Tougher Penalties In Assault on Corporate
Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2002, at Al (quoting the President that "the free enterprise
system ... requires trust. We've had some destroy the trust of the American people,
and we need to do something about it.").
4 Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
PITT. L. REV. 741, 764 (2000) (noting that "trust plays a key role in the formation and
function of capital markets" but "trust is an important consideration not often
recognized by those considering the role of law in financial markets").
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directors, larcenous executives, and dishonest brokers,
investment advisors and mutual fund managers?
A. The Rational Expectations Investor
Implicit in most academic discussions of securities
policy lies a standard answer to this question. Like legal
scholars everywhere, legal scholars who specialize in securities
regulation have been strongly influenced over the past two
decades by the "law and economics" school of analysis. The law
and economics school, in turn, relies on a model of investor
behavior that I will call the "rational expectations" investor
model.5 Another apt appellation might be the "sophisticated"
investor model.
According to the rational expectations model, investors
behave like members of the species homo economicus: they are
cool, calculating and purely self-interested actors. What's
more-and this second point is critical to understanding the
rational expectations approach-the rational expectations
investor assumes that other participants in the market,
including corporate managers and securities professionals like
brokers and mutual fund managers, are also cool, calculating
and purely self-interested actors. A rational expectations
investor accordingly approaches the business of investing as
she would approach a chess game. She assumes that corporate
insiders and securities professionals will steal her money if
they can do so, just as she assumes that the other player in a
chess game will take her queen if she leaves it exposed.
This means that a rational expectations investor will
only be willing to plunk down her hard-earned dollars to buy
stocks, bonds or mutual fund shares if she is presented with
evidence sufficient to persuade her that corporate insiders and
securities professionals face external constraints adequate to
discourage them from stealing and shirking, and external
rewards sufficient to give them incentive to run their firms and
their clients' portfolios well and profitably. To return to the
chess analogy, the rational expectations investor will not move
' I borrow the phrase "rational expectations" from game theory, a branch of
economic analysis in which the homo economicus model has reached its zenith. See
generally Sanford J. Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations
Under Assymetric Information, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 541 (1981) (discussing rational
expectations theory); Lynn A. Stout, Irrational Expectations, 3 J. LEGAL THEORY 227,
228, 239-47 (1995) (same); Robert M. Townsend, Market Anticipations, Rational
Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis, 19 INT'L ECON. REV. 481 (1987) (same).
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her queen to an open space on the board until she is sure the
other player can't take it. Rational expectations investors do
not invest on faith. They take nothing for granted. Rather, they
must be provided with evidence that they are adequately
protected before they will part with their money. Absent such
evidence, they prefer to bury their savings in a coffee can in the
backyard.
The rational expectations investor model has two
important implications. The first is that investors value
securities accurately. They will only pay a high price for a
particular security if the evidence demonstrates that it is, in
fact, a quality investment, with a relatively high expected
return or a relatively low level of expected risk. If the available
information suggests that the firm is doing poorly-or if the
information is inadequate for investors to determine if the firm
is doing well-rational expectations investors refuse to pay a
high price for the firm's securities, and indeed may refuse to
buy them at all. The end result is an "efficient" stock market in
which the prices of corporate securities accurately reflect their
fundamental values.
Economists, finance theorists and securities scholars
have, of course, paid an enormous amount of attention to the
notion that the market rationally values securities.6 Indeed one
might suggest, with only the tip of the tongue in one's cheek,
that academic publications arguing for and against market
efficiency have contributed significantly to global deforestation.
Rather than add to this problem, I focus on the second
important implication of the rational expectations investor
model, which has received far less attention than the first. This
is the implication that rational expectations investors do not
need mandatory antifraud rules to protect them from losing
their investments.
To understand this argument, recall that rational
expectations investors not only behave rationally and selfishly
themselves, but also expect others to behave rationally and
selfishly. This means that rational expectations investors
presume that corporate insiders and securities professionals
will not hesitate to lie, cheat or steal whenever they can get
6 For general discussions of the concept of market efficiency and the debate
surrounding it, see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE
BEST INVESTMENT ADVICE FOR THE NEW CENTURY 199-274 (1999); and RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 349-77 (6th ed.
2000).
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away with it. They recognize that, by putting their money into
the stock market, they expose themselves to the risk that it will
be squandered by negligent directors who manage companies
poorly, stolen by dishonest executives who loot their firms or
pilfered by unscrupulous brokers who drain their clients'
accounts. As a result, a rational expectations investor demands
that the legal system effectively constrain corporate
opportunism.7 If the legal system does not-if it allows
directors to be negligent, managers to be disloyal and brokers
to be dishonest-rational expectations investors are the first to
recognize this and to remove their money from harm's way by
refusing to invest.
The notion that rational expectations investors
recognize when they are exposed to the risk of fraud and can
protect themselves by refusing to invest has had a tremendous
influence on contemporary securities regulation scholarship. It
has become standard operating procedure for theorists to argue
that inadequate legal protection for investors does not
primarily hurt investors.8 Instead, they argue that it harms
issuers-companies and businesses that would like to raise
capital by selling stocks and bonds to the public. Inadequate
antifraud rules supposedly harm companies because when
investors cannot distinguish good, honest, well-run companies
from poorly-managed or dishonest firms (so-called "lemons"),
they refuse to pay a decent price for the securities of either.
Thus, solid firms cannot get investors to buy their stocks and
7 The phrase "legal system" includes both the constraints of criminal law
and those of contract law.
8 The idea that inadequate antifraud rules harm sellers traces back to
George Akerlofs Nobel-prize winning work on so-called "markets for lemons." See
George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 494-99 (1970) (arguing that when buyers cannot
distinguish high-quality goods from low-quality goods or "lemons," they will refuse to
pay high prices, high-quality merchandise will be withdrawn from the market, and the
market will come to be dominated by lemons). It is a standard practice among
securities scholars to make parallel arguments regarding the securities markets. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-74 (1984) (using lemons argument in
the context of securities markets); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83
VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457-59 (1997) (same); Adam C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions With Exchanges As Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85
VA. L. REV. 925, 939 (1999) (same); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2362-64 (1998) (same). A
variation is the argument that, even if there are unsophisticated investors in the
market, they will be protected to the extent that they rely upon more sophisticated
institutional investors to make their investment choices and to set prices in an efficient
market. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 942 (1998).
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bonds because they cannot distinguish themselves, in investors'
minds, from confidence schemes and scam artists.9
An instructive example of this sort of argument can be
found in an article recently published by Professor Roberta
Romano in the Yale Law Journal."° Professor Romano offers a
proposal for (as she puts it) "empowering investors." However,
the way in which she suggests we empower investors is one I
suspect many investors would view with little enthusiasm. This
is because the heart of Professor Romano's argument is her
recommendation that we change federal securities law to allow
corporations that sell stocks and bonds to investors in the
United States to elect not to be regulated by U.S. securities
law, but instead by the laws of other nations or states-
including nations and states that do not provide antifraud
protection.
In other words, Professor Romano proposes that we
empower investors by allowing corporations to opt out of U.S.
antifraud rules and into legal systems that permit fraud. She
suggests this, of course, because she does not believe investors
actually will be defrauded. Rather, she argues that if
corporations elect to be governed by legal regimes that lack
effective antifraud rules, investors will refuse to purchase those
firms' securities. As she puts it, "[it is silly to contend that
investors will choose regimes that encourage fraud.""
This example illustrates how the argument that
investors are sophisticated actors who know what legal
protections they enjoy, and so are fully capable of protecting
themselves from securities fraud by not investing, has shaped
the course of contemporary theoretical discussions of securities
policy. Indeed, it has become something of an intellectual gaffe
for a serious securities scholar to suggest that investors might
actually need some investor protection to prevent their
exploitation. In the words of Judge (then Professor) Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, both of the
University of Chicago, many theoreticians view the argument
that securities laws are necessary to protect unsophisticated
9 It should be noted that reducing the securities market to a "market for
lemons" through inadequate antifraud protection indirectly harms investors to the
extent they lose the opportunity to identify and invest in quality securities. They do
not, however, suffer the primary harm of losing their investments to fraud.
10 See Romano, supra note 8.
" Id. at 2368.
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investors as being "as unsophisticated as the investors it is
supposed to protect."
12
Yet, as any law student who has taken a course in
securities regulation knows, the Congress that passed the
Securities Act of 1933"' and the Securities Exchange Act of
193414 gave every appearance of taking the need for
government-imposed investor protection quite seriously. 5
History taught them that investors could, in fact, be defrauded.
Recent events are bringing home the same lesson. In the past
year alone, American investors have lost hundreds of billions of
dollars in market capitalization as reports of questionable
accounting practices have surfaced at such firms as Enron,"6
Xerox, 7 Global Crossing8 and (most recently) WorldCom."9
Surely most of the investors who have lost money on these
stocks have not dealt with their loss by calmly shrugging and
saying, "oh, well, I knew that I might be defrauded when I
bought that stock. That's why I paid such a low price for that
lemon."
Instead, the American investor appears to have been
caught flat-footed. She was unprepared for the prospect of
widespread financial fraud. She did not expect her corporate
managers to lie, cheat or steal. Now that she suspects many of
them have, she feels anxious. She feels distrustful. She feels-
12 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 694. Although Easterbrook and
Fischel were speaking about mandatory disclosure rules when they made this remark,
in their discussion of antifraud rules in the same article, they also emphasized
investors' supposed abilities to protect themselves by refusing to buy. See id. at 676.
13 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
15 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77j(c) (authorizing the Securities and Exchange
Commission to require issuers to provide in their prospectuses such information as is
necessary "for the protection of investors"); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1) (authorizing the
Securities and Exchange Commission to prescribe such antifraud rules "as necessary or
appropriate... for the protection of investors").
16 See John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A3; John A. Byrne et al., Enron & Beyond, Bus. WK., Feb.
25, 2002, at 118.
17 James Bandler & John Hechinger, SEC Says Xerox Mislead Investors By
Manipulating Its Earnings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A3.
18 Dennis K Berman & Deborah Solomon, Optical Illusion? Accounting
Questions Swirl Around Pioneer in the Telecom World, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at
Al.
19 Michael Schroeder, SEC Files Civil Suit Against WorldCom: Agency Moves
Quickly After Company Disclosures, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A3. See also David
Wessel, Why the Bad Guys of the Boardroom Emerged En Masse, WALL ST. J., June 20,
2002, at Al, A6 (presenting table of recent cases of alleged accounting fraud that lists,
among others, Adelphia, CMS Energy, Computer Associates, Dynegy, Halliburton,
Kmart, Microstrategy and Tyco International).
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as the cover of Business Week magazine recently trumpeted-
betrayed.20
B. The Trusting Investor
The notion that an investor might feel "betrayed"
suggests an alternative model of investor behavior that differs
substantially from the rational expectations model of the law
and economics school. I call this alternative the model of the
unsophisticated investor-or, as I prefer to refer to her, the
trusting investor.2'
Before I develop this idea further, I would like to
explore what I mean when I use the phrase "trusting investor."
When I contrast the trusting investor with the rational
expectations investor, I am not suggesting that trusting
investors are irrational in the lay sense of that word. Rather, I
am suggesting that trusting investors do not behave as if they
had what an economist would call "rational expectations."
Rational expectations analysis assumes that people not
only behave in a purely self-interested fashion, but also expect
others always to behave in a purely self-interested fashion.
This assumption reflects rational expectations' roots in game
theory, where people are presumed to be interested only in
winning the game without regard to consequences for others.
Similarly, rational expectations investors expect others to
opportunistically exploit them whenever possible. As a result,
rational expectations investors are forward-looking. Before
they are willing to stick their necks out, they seek to
understand their opponents' constraints, and to calculate
whether those constraints are sufficient to deter their
opponents from exploiting them. Rational expectations
20 The Betrayed Investor, BUS. WK., Feb. 25, 2002 (cover).
21 1 am using the word "trust" here to describe behavior with three
characteristics. First, trust involves at least two actors: the actor who trusts, and the
actor who is trusted. Second, trust requires the trusting actor to intentionally make
herself vulnerable to the trusted actor, in circumstances where the trusted actor could
benefit from taking advantage of the trusting actor's vulnerability. Third, trust
requires the trusting actor to make herself vulnerable because she believes that the
trusted actor will behave trustworthily, even in the absence of evidence of external
rewards and punishments sufficient to ensure this. See generally Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1745-53 (2001) (discussing nature and definition of
trust). This formulation excludes what Oliver Williamson has dubbed "calculative
trust," meaning trustworthy behavior driven by the fear of legal or market sanctions.
See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J. L.
& ECON. 453, 485-86 (1993) (discussing calculative trust).
20021
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investors accordingly protect themselves from exploitation by
refusing to become vulnerable in the first place.
In contrast, a trusting investor is willing to believe that
at least some people (and, as I discuss below, possibly some
institutions) might be trustworthy. For example, if person A
always has behaved cooperatively, the trusting investor is
willing to entertain the notion that person A for some reason
simply is inclined toward cooperation." Trusting investors
accordingly look to the past: if someone has behaved in a
particular fashion before, trusting investors assume that
person will continue to behave similarly in the future, even if
they don't fully understand what drives the behavior.
(Economists sometimes describe this sort of backward-looking
analysis as "adaptive expectations," to distinguish it from
rational expectations.)" Trusting investors, unlike rational
expectations investors, are willing to make themselves
vulnerable to persons (or possibly institutions) that have
behaved cooperatively in the past, because they view past
behavior as prima facie evidence those persons or institutions
will continue to behave cooperatively in the future. As a result,
trusting investors can be betrayed and defrauded-at least
once.
I have come to believe that many if not most of the
individuals who invest in the American stock market more
closely resemble the trusting model of investor behavior than
the rational expectations model. Consider the substantial
anecdotal evidence of investor trust. I suspect I am not the only
person who believes she has a nest egg simply because she has
a file full of papers. Indeed, I have found that when I ask
otherwise-sensible people where they have invested their
savings, they often confess to a rather stunning degree of
ignorance about such matters. I invite you to repeat this
experiment among your own friends.
Such observations alone should raise the suspicion that
many investors are trusting investors. But if further evidence
is needed, one can find it by simply thinking more carefully
about the nature of the modern securities market. The
importance of trust to the American securities market is
proven by the very existence of the market. This is because a
2' A rational expectations investor would view a past history of cooperative
behavior as a potential trick.
23 See, e.g., ROBERT A. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 60-61 (2000)
(discussing adaptive expectations); Grossman, supra note 5, at 543 (same).
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rational expectations investor-a distrustful investor who
expects corporate managers and securities professionals to lie,
cheat, steal and shirk, and demands proof that they are
somehow constrained from doing this before investing-would
never buy corporate securities in the first place.
Distrustful investors would avoid a public securitie's
market because, for most, the information costs associated with
participating in such a market are so enormous as to
discourage even trying. Imagine you are a rational expectations
investor who is contemplating acquiring a modest but
diversified portfolio of corporate equities through a broker.
Consider the many people in a position to steal from you. These
include the broker, the broker's administrative assistant and
almost anyone else in the broker's firm. A rational expectations
investor would want to make sure that each and every one of
these presumably larcenous individuals had external
incentives sufficient to deter them from stealing and sufficient
to encourage them to do a good job. This means knowing not
only securities law and the rules of broker-dealer regulation (as
well as the procedures and punishments involved in applying
such laws and regulations) but also the details of the
individuals' and firm's incentive contracts and compliance
systems.
And what about the companies in which the broker
invests the rational expectations investor's portfolio? Each of
these companies is also, presumably, filled with opportunistic
actors-directors, officers and employees-who would not
hesitate to shirk or commit fraud if they thought the likely
gains outweighed the likely costs. Before the rational
expectations investor would place her money in the hands of
such individuals, she would again need assurance that law and
contract adequately constrain them from shirking and stealing.
Some rational expectations investors might conclude
that this sort of omniscience is not needed to invest because
auditing firms, the SEC and more sophisticated investors will
monitor securities professionals and corporate insiders. This
sort of argument, however, only moves the problem back a step.
Why would a rational expectations investor assume that third
parties have the proper incentives and constraints to do the
job, if she does not actually research the third parties'
incentives and constraints?24 For example, why should a
2 For example, rogue broker Frank Gruttadauria was in theory overseen by
2002]
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rational expectations investor assume that the managing
partner of an accounting firm has the desire or the ability to
uncover fraud, that the relevant bureaucrat at the SEC has the
means and the will to punish it, or that a mutual fund portfolio
manager has adequate incentive to monitor against it?
A rational expectations investor accordingly would have
to do an enormous amount of homework to safely conclude
simply that her money was unlikely to be stolen-and
determining whether one's money is likely to be stolen is only
the first step in evaluating an investment. Even after a
rational expectations investor concludes that she is unlikely to
be cheated or lied to, she must still figure out whether the
security at issue is a good investment. To do this, she must
understand not only all the rights and privileges that
accompany the security, but also the firm that issues it,
including the firm's governance structure, the quality of its
products and employees, the nature of the markets in which it
competes, its relationships with customers and suppliers, its
regulatory environment and its financial health.25 A distrustful,
rational expectations investor accordingly would work herself
into exhaustion gathering, verifying and analyzing information
before she could feel secure enough to hold a diversified
portfolio of publicly-traded equities. Burying her money in a
coffee can in the backyard may be the better investment option.
It might be argued that rational expectations investors
do not actually need to gather and analyze all this information,
because an "efficient" stock market does the job for them.26 This
argument, however, presumes that rational expectations
investors believe the stock market is not only "informationally"
efficient (prices respond rapidly to new information) but also
"fundamental value" efficient (prices respond not only quickly,
but accurately, so that they reflect the best possible estimates
of fundamental value). 7 This is a dubious presumption, given
a compliance officer, but that officer had a very poor incentive structure; Gruttadauria
was the head of the brokerage office, and the compliance officer's boss. See supra text
accompanying note 1 (discussing Gruttadauria case); Boards Need To Examine
Auditors, FUND DIRECTIONS, Mar. 2002, at 6 (noting that the compliance officer for
Gruttadauria's branch office reported to Gruttadauria himself).
25 A graduate-level course on finance theory would also be of help.
26 See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing concept of market
efficiency).
27 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 646-50 (1995)
(distinguishing informational from fundamental value efficiency and discussing how
the empirical evidence favors the former); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that
[Vol. 68: 2
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that even prominent economists question the market's
fundamental value efficiency."8
Thus it seems something of a miracle that the U.S. stock
market, as we know it, even exists. Nearly 40% of all American
adults choose to own stocks either directly or through mutual
funds or self-directed retirement accounts.9 What's more, half
of these investors have portfolios with a value of $28,000 or
less' -hardly enough to justify the sort of exhaustive research
necessary to persuade rational expectations investors to invest.
What then convinces these investors to risk their hard-earned
money by buying corporate securities?
The answer is trust. American investors take it as a
matter of faith that the brokers and mutual fund managers to
whom they entrust their savings will use those funds to
actually purchase securities on their behalf. They take it as a
matter of faith that the corporations that issue securities really
exist, have real assets and make real profits. Because they
have faith, American investors buy trillions of dollars of
corporate equities each year, even when they are not quite sure
what it is that they are buying."' (One could not ask for a more
instructive example than Enron. Before its sudden and
shocking collapse, the firm was routinely cited as one of the
best-run and most innovative companies in America, even
though neither the shareholders who owned its stock nor the
analysts who followed its progress really understood how
Enron made its money.)32
the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344-49 (1986) (same).
2s Compare BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 6, at 368-77 (generally supporting
fundamental value efficiency while noting many puzzling anomalies), and MALKIEL,
supra note 6, at 270 (concluding after extensive review of evidence that "pricing
irregularities and predictable patterns may well exist," while doubting whether
investors can exploit patterns through short term trading), with Fischer Black, Noise,
41 J. FIN. 529, 532-33 (1986) (arguing against fundamental value efficiency); SHILLER,
supra note 23 (same); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (same).
The trusting investor model itself offers an explanation for fundamental
value inefficiency. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
29 N.Y.S.E., NYSE FACTBOOK FOR THE YEAR 2000, 2001, at 55-66 [hereinafter
NYSE FACTROOKI (noting that 43.6% of the adult population, or eighty-five million
individuals, own stocks directly or through mutual funds, retirement savings accounts
and pension plans, and that seventy-six million own their stocks directly or through
mutual funds and self-directed retirement accounts).
30 Id. at 57 (noting median portfolio of $28,000).
31 See id. at 9 (noting that more than $11 trillion in corporate equities were
traded on the NYSE in 2000).
32 See Nanette Byrnes, Paying for the Sins of Enron, BUS. WK., Feb. 11, 2002,
at 35 (observing that "[a]s Enron imploded, investors realized they had never really
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This is not to say that American investors necessarily
believe that corporate insiders and securities professionals are
honest and dependable individuals. (Although I personally am
willing to entertain the possibility that most are honest and
dependable, I concede recent events have raised doubts.) The
average investor may not trust all or even any of the individual
actors who together comprise the institution we call "the
market." At a minimum, however, American investors must
believe that somehow the legal system constrains these
individuals sufficiently that the benefits of investing outweigh
the risks. They must believe that the regulators are regulating,
and the watchdogs are watching. In other words, investors may
not need to trust people before they are willing to give up their
hard-earned dollars. But they must at least trust the system.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF INVESTOR CONFIDENCE
Why and under what circumstances do investors trust
the system? I devote the balance of my discussion to the
phenomenon of investor confidence, and to exploring some of
the factors that may encourage and discourage it. My
comments are preliminary; in speculating about the nature and
limits of investor trust, I intend more to suggest avenues for
future research than to provide conclusive answers.
Nevertheless, given the importance of investor confidence to
modern financial markets, the time has come for us to pay
more attention to the available evidence on when and under
what circumstances people tend to trust others.
As it turns out, there is a large body of both theoretical
and empirical evidence on trust. The phenomenon of trust has
been the subject of innumerable case studies, behavioral
experiments and theoretical discussions."' I do not intend to
understood how the company made its money"); Rebecca Smith & John Emshiller,
Trading Places: Fancy Finances Were Key to Enron's Success, and Now to Its Distress,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2001, at Al (noting that Enron "routinely made published lists of
the most-admired and innovative companies in America" although it had a "seemingly
impenetrable financial structure"); Susanne Craig & Jonthan Weil, Most Analysts
Remain Plugged In to Enron, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at C1 ("Wall Street
researchers have been overwhelmingly-critics would say blindly-enthusiastic about
Enron, even as they acknowledge not always understanding the complex financial
transactions that accounted for its soaring profits"); Ron Scherer & David R. Francis,
Lessons of Enron: How Could No One Have Seen It?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16,
2002, at 1 ("In Enron's case, the analysts who covered the firm may not have fully
understood what was going on .... [A]nalysts started to trust the company instead of
maintaining a skeptical attitude.").
" The literature on trust is vast and varied. For a few examples, see Blair &
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survey that body of literature in its entirety here. Rather, I will
leap ahead to the punch line-or, more accurately, to two
punch lines. First, trust exists. In a wide variety of
circumstances, people appear willing to trust (i.e., make
themselves vulnerable to) others who could benefit from
violating their trust. Of course, most of us know from
introspection that we are willing to trust friends and family
members in this fashion. But subjects in behavioral
experiments also regularly demonstrate a willingness to trust
strangers, groups of strangers and even nonhuman actors, like
computers.
Second, this willingness to trust depends heavily on
something experimenters call "history effects."35 In lay terms,
the decision whether or not to trust another actor is strongly
influenced by one's past experience with that actor or with
similar actors in similar situations. This means that, given a
history of favorable experience, people will accept a rather high
degree of vulnerability to others, apparently believing it safe to
trust. Conversely, a history of unfavorable experience makes
one distrustful and unwilling to make oneself vulnerable. Put
simply, trust is learned.
That people trust, and that trust is influenced by
history, is something most of us already know quite well from
personal experience. Nevertheless, it can be useful to test the
validity of one's experience against more formal evidence.
Thus, let us consider a type of common experimental game that
provides strong evidence in support of these two points (that
trust exists, and that it depends in part on experience). This
experimental game is often called the "Give Something" game.
To hint at its relevance to the topic of investor confidence, I
Stout, supra note 21; Peter Brann & Margaret Foddy, Trust and the Consumption of a
Deteriorating Common Resource, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 615 (1987); TRUST IN SOCIETY
(Karen S. Cook ed., 2001); TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
(Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); FRANCIS FUKuyAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (Free Press Paperbacks 1996) (1995) ; Michael W. Macy &
John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A
Computational Model, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 638 (1998); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness
and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993); Carol M. Rose, Trust in the
Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (1995); and Julian B. Rotter,
Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (1980); see
also authorities on institutional trust cited infra note 54.
See infra text accompanying notes 39-41, 50-52, 62-64.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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note that the "Give Something" game is also sometimes called
the "Investment" game."
A. Trust Behavior in the "Give Something" Game
In a typical Give Something game, a group of
experimental subjects is brought together and each subject is
given an amount of money. The subjects then are told they can
choose to invest some or all of their money into a common pool.
In the parlance of experimental gaming, this is called
"cooperating." Alternatively, the subjects are told they can
choose to keep all their money for themselves. Experimenters
call this "defecting." Finally, the subjects are also told that any
money contributed to the pool will be multiplied by some factor
and redistributed to the players. 7 But-here's the catch-the
players are told that the money will be redistributed in equal
shares to all, whether or not they chose to contribute in the
first place."
Such rules place the players in a Give Something game
in a difficult dilemma. Consider a simple example of a game
played by four players, each of whom is given $10 and told that
'" See, e.g., Sara Kiesler et al., A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment on
Cooperation with People and Human-Like Computers, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 47, 51 (1996) (describing game in which subjects were asked to interact with
an 'investment partner"); S.S. Komorita et al., The Effects of Reward Structure and
Reciprocity in Social Dilemmas, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 252 (1993)
(describing experiment in which subjects were instructed that they could choose to
'invest" in common pool).
More broadly, the Give Something/Investment Game is an example of an
important type of experimental game known among social scientists as a "social
dilemma." See generally RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS: DYNAMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND
INTERGROUP ASPECTS (Margaret Foddy et al. eds., 1999). Researchers have shown an
enduring fascination for social dilemmas, and over the past half-century have
published the results of hundreds of experiments reporting consistent results. See
generally Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 169 (1980)
[hereinafter Social Dilemmas] (reviewing studies); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H.
Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1988) [hereinafter Cooperation]
(summarizing studies); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not
Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990)
(summarizing studies); David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas:
A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58 (1995)
(summarizing over 100 studies done between 1958 and 1992).
37 In order to create a social dilemma, this multiplication factor must be
greater than one but less than the total number of players in the game.
3'As this example illustrates, a social dilemma game like the Give
Something game presents its subjects with a payoff function similar to the famed
Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory. As in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma, each
subject must choose to either cooperate or defect. As in the case of the Prisoner's
Dilemma, each individual player always serves her self-interest best by defecting, yet if
all defect, all end up worse off than if they had cooperated.
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any contributions to the common pool will be doubled and
redistributed equally. Suppose a player in this game expects
her three fellow players to defect. In this case she is best off
keeping her $10 for herself. After all, if she contributes her $10
to the pool it will be doubled to $20, but then shared among all
four players, so she only gets $5 back. Alternatively, suppose
she expects her three fellows to cooperate. She is still best off if
she defects: she not only keeps her initial $10, but also gets an
extra $15, one-quarter of the $60 common pool created from the
others' contributions.
Rational and selfish actors asked to play a Give
Something game accordingly should always choose to defect.
This is an unfortunate choice, however, because if all defect, all
receive the minimum possible payout and walk away with only
$10. In contrast, if all the players cooperate by contributing
their $10, the common pool will total $40. Once this amount is
doubled and redistributed, each player will walk away with
$20. Thus, cooperation, not defection, results in the maximum
payout.
Nevertheless, a purely selfish person asked to play the
Give Something game should always choose to defect, because
no matter what the other players do, she always maximizes her
own returns by defecting. The Give Something game
consequently illustrates how the rational pursuit of self
interest sometimes can ensure the worst possible outcome.
Given this unfortunate result, it is perhaps cause for
celebration that numerous studies have established
conclusively that real people do not behave like purely self-
interested actors when they play the Give Something game.
Hundreds of these types of experiments have been reported in
the literature, 9 and researchers have found that as a general
rule, the average subject contributes approximately 50% of her
initial stake to the common pool.4° This is true even when
experimenters go to great lengths to ensure that the subjects in
the game understand that there is no possible external reward
for contributing.4'
'9 See sources cited supra note 36.
40 See Dawes & Thaler, Cooperation, supra note 36, at 189 (noting that
subjects on average contribute 40% to 60% in social dilemma games); Sally, supra note
36, at 62 (reporting average cooperation rate of 50% in a statistical study of more than
100 published social dilemma experiments).
41 For example, many social dilemma experiments have been structured so
that the players played anonymously, assured that their choice of strategy would
remain unknown to both the experimenter and their fellow players. Sally, supra note
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Why does this happen? The question of why people
cooperate in these sorts of social dilemma games is a complex
one that scholars have addressed at length elsewhere.4" For
present purposes, I would like to focus on one aspect of the
experimental evidence that may have special relevance for the
question of investor confidence. This is the finding that subjects
are far more likely to contribute to the common pool in a Give
Something game when they believe that their fellow players will
also contribute.43 Conversely, if a player expects her fellow
players to defect, studies show that she is far less likely to
contribute herself.
This finding suggests that experimental subjects tend to
view the Give Something game as a situation that calls for
reciprocal trust." If a player thinks her fellow players are going
to selfishly defect, she will defect herself. But if a player thinks
her fellow players are going to "play fair" and contribute, she
too will contribute. This latter sort of thinking requires trust,
because a player who believes that her fellow players will
contribute in the Give Something game must believe this
despite that fact that-as a rational player would know quite
well-the external incentives reward defection. In other words,
the behavior of experimental subjects in social dilemma games
suggests that we do not always assume other people will
36, at 65, 67. This structure eliminates any possibility that the other players or the
experimenter will take vengeance on the defecting player. Similarly, in a number of
studies the experimenters "debriefed" their subjects after the game was over to
determine if they understood the structure of the game, and found that the subjects did
indeed recognize that cooperation reduced their own payoffs. Id. at 70.
42 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 1764-80 (discussing explanations
for cooperation); Kelly S. Bouas & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in
Social Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145-46 (same);
Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural Goal/Expectations Theory of Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, 3 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 51, 66-74 (1986) (same).
43 Yamagishi, supra note 42, at 64-65 ("Expectations about other members'
behavior is one of the most important individual factors affecting members' decisions in
social dilemmas."); Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 36, at 187 (same); see, e.g.,
Craig D. Parks et al., Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in a Social Dilemma,
40 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143 (1996).
See, e.g., S.S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity and the Induction of Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 607, 608 ("There is
considerable evidence that the reciprocity norm is relevant and important in a social
dilemma situation .... The norm . . .prescribes that we should help those who have
helped us in the past and retaliate against those who have injured us . . . ."); Parks et
al., supra note 43, at 135 (discussing role of trust and expected reciprocation in
triggering cooperation in social dilemmas); Yamagishi, supra note 42, at 64-65
(discussing experimental findings regarding expectations about others' behavior and
noting that "expectations for other members' cooperation is related to trust in other
members").
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behave in a purely selfish fashion. Sometimes we are prepared
to assume that even total strangers may behave cooperatively.
Sometimes we are prepared to trust-at least until our
experience suggests our trust has been misplaced.45
Like trust generally, trust behavior in experimental
games is subject to history effects.46 One of the most important
findings in the experimental literature on trust is that if a
subject believes that a particular person has proven
untrustworthy in the past, she is far less likely to make herself
vulnerable to that person in the future. For example, when
researchers ask subjects to play social dilemma games
repeatedly with each other, they often find that cooperation
rates decline over time when cooperating players learn that
other players are defecting, because the cooperating players
begin to defect themselves." Conversely, when an experimental
subject interacts with the same partner repeatedly and that
partner proves trustworthy, the subject will become willing to
make herself even more vulnerable than she was in initial
rounds.48
Such results suggest that the primary difference
between the behavior of real subjects playing experimental
games, and the behavior of the hypothetical "rational
expectations" game player, is that real people behave as if they
believe in character. Put differently, real people behave as if
they believe that, for some reason, some players refrain from
opportunistic behavior even when they could safely indulge in
it. Thus, unlike the rational expectations player, the trusting
player does not have to investigate others' external incentives
before she is willing to believe that they might behave in a
responsible fashion. She does not have to assure herself that
every individual she deals with is constrained (as a game
theorist would put it) by "the shadow of the future"-the fear of
future rewards and punishments.49
45 The trusting behavior subjects display in experimental games is by no
means the same thing as gullibility. Subjects in the Give Something game make
themselves vulnerable when they donate to the common pool, in the apparent belief
that at least some of their fellow players also will donate. But this belief is not naive:
the studies also demonstrate that many players do in fact donate.
46 See Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12
RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 131 (2000).
" See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 1767, 1776.
48 See id. at 1774-75.
49 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12-13, 126-27
(1984) (discussing "shadow of the future" as source of cooperation in social dilemmas).
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Instead, the trusting player looks to "the shadow of the
past." If a person has proven cooperative in a particular
situation in the past, the trusting player will expect that
person to be cooperative in similar situations in the future,
without bothering to think too much about why this might be
so. Conversely, if a person has proven untrustworthy in the
past, the trusting player will assume that person has an
untrustworthy "character"--again, without bothering to think
too hard about the matter.
B. Trust Behavior in the Stock Market
One might object that it is a bit of a stretch to think we
can learn something about the behavior of investors who
interact with a complex system like the stock market from the
behavior observed when people interact with other people in an
experimental game. Perhaps it is. As noted earlier, it is
possible that many investors do not assume that corporate
managers and securities professionals are generally honorable,
trustworthy, law-abiding sorts. To the contrary, they may
assume that many if not most of the human actors who
comprise the market are scoundrels. These investors invest not
because they trust managers, brokers and investment advisors,
but because they rely on the legal system (including legally
enforceable contracts) to discourage managers, brokers and
investment advisors from behaving like the scoundrels that
they are.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that such
reliance may still reflect a form of trust." Significant evidence
so Public securities markets resemble social dilemma games because to get
the optimal result, two types of players (investors on one hand, and corporate
managers and securities professionals on the other) must cooperate with and make
themselves vulnerable to each other. Investors make themselves vulnerable by
providing the money needed to capitalize corporate enterprise. Market professionals
make themselves vulnerable by investing their careers in acquiring the skills necessary
to manage large firms and large portfolios. If investors were to "defect" by withdrawing
their capital from the market en masse, corporate managers and securities
professionals would be left worse off, just as investors would be left worse off if
corporate managers and securities professionals were to "defect" by committing fraud
en masse.
Social dilemma games do not perfectly replicate the problems raised by
stock markets, however, because the incentives of corporate managers and the
incentives of investors differ to some extent. For managers, the stock market looks like
a prisoner's dilemma. No matter what investors do (cooperate by investing funds or
defect by refusing to invest), a rational and purely selfish manager is always better off
if she defrauds the investor whenever this can be done. From the investor's perspective,
the stock market presents incentives that resemble the incentives of the game theorists
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supports the idea that people can trust not only their fellow
human beings, but also nonhuman actors-including systems
and institutions. As an example of this phenomenon, consider
another interesting finding from the Give Something game
experiments: a substantial proportion of human subjects will
contribute when asked to play the Give Something game not
with other people, but with a computer.5' (Interestingly, the
highest cooperation rates are observed when subjects interact
with a computer that looks like a computer. Cooperation rates
decline when subjects are asked to deal with a computer that
presents a video image of a human face and speaks with a
synthesized voice, perhaps because they perceive a computer
that "tries to look human" as less trustworthy than a
straightforward, old-fashioned, beige-box sort of computer.)"
Such findings suggest that the human tendency toward
trust is so strong and universal that many people are prepared
to believe not only in the innate character or trustworthiness of
other people, but also in the innate character or
trustworthiness of things-including, perhaps, such abstract
things as "the law" or "the stock market."53 Many social
scientists who study trust subscribe to this notion and believe
that people can place their trust in complex systems and
institutions just as they can place their trust in other people.
Thus, there is a rather extensive literature on institutional
trust.
5 4
The possibility that many investors invest because they
"trust the market" (a phrase that incorporates both personal
trust in a particular broker or investment advisor, and
call "stag hunt." In the stag hunt game, both players do best if both cooperate, but if
one defects, the optimal strategy for the other is also to defect. See generally Paul G.
Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest
Norm Efficient? 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027, 2041-42 (2001) (describing stag hunt game).
Similarly, if investors believe managers are trustworthy, the best payoffs come from
trusting. If investors believe managers are untrustworthy and will defect, the next-best
strategy is to refuse to invest.
Although an extensive body of literature documents how experimental
subjects behave in social dilemmas, I am unaware of any parallel empirical literature
on human behavior in games that present incentives similar to those of the stag hunt
game. 51 Kiesler et al., supra note 36, at 60.
52 Id.
See id. at 63 (concluding that "[hiuman social behavior... does not depend
on interaction with people or even categorization in a human group").
See, e.g., RODERICK M. KRAMER & TOM R. TYLER, TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS
(1996); TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS (Christel Lane & Reinhard
Bachmann eds., 1998); PioTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43-44 (1999)
(discussing "trust directed at institutions and organizations").
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institutional trust in the legal system or the market) offers to
explain a number of otherwise-puzzling market anomalies that
are difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the rational
expectations model. An intriguing example can be found in a
recent study that concludes that as investors age, they tend to
put a larger portion of their investment portfolios into
corporate equities.55 This behavior is inconsistent with both
rational expectations and with conventional investment
wisdom, which recommends that investors put more of their
portfolios into stocks when they are young56 and reduce risk by
weighting their portfolios more toward debt or cash as they
approach retirement.57
That investor interest in equities increases with age is
easily explained, however, under the trusting investor model.
The trust model suggests that young investors may buy modest
amounts of stock even if they know almost nothing about the
formal rights they enjoy at law or the business in which they
are investing. They buy because they are willing to "have a go"
at trusting, just as many experimental subjects are willing to
have a go at trusting their fellow players in the Give
Something game. If their investment is successful-if their
trust proves justified-they become willing to trust more, and
still more again, as they gain experience with the market.
Thus, the trust model of investor behavior predicts that
investors who enjoy generous returns from their stock
investments when they are in their thirties and forties will
naturally become more trusting (and more willing to invest a
larger portion of their portfolios in equities) in their fifties and
sixties. This scenario may describe the investing experience
and behavior of many members of the "Baby Boom" generation,
who enjoyed great luck with their stock investments during the
1980s and as a result became even more eager to buy stocks in
the boom market of the 1990s.
55 John Ameriks & Stephen P. Zledes, How Do Household Portfolio Shares
Vary With Age? 43 (Dec. 3, 2001) (draft on file with the author) (reporting results of
study finding that equity portfolio shares increase strongly with age).
If they dare to own stocks at all, something I have already argued is often
inconsistent with rational expectations. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
" See Ameriks & Zledes, supra note 55, at 1, 3-11 (discussing how basic
portfolio theory predicts that the portion of wealth held in equities should remain
constant, while professional advisors suggest decreasing equity ownership with age);
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 368 (4th ed. 1995) (noting
that "as investors age, they should start cutting back on riskier investments").
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In addition to explaining why investors favor equities
more as they grow older, the trusting investor model also is
consistent with recent work done by finance theorists on the
otherwise-puzzling market phenomena of over-volatility and
speculative bubbles. Robert Shiller has concluded from a long-
term study of the market that stock prices vary more than can
possibly be explained by changes in underlying corporate
earnings; in economic terms, the market appears far more
volatile than efficient market theory predicts.58 The Crash of
1987, and the remarkable run-up in stock prices (especially
technology stocks) in the late 1990s, also have lead many
informed observers to conclude the stock market is susceptible
to speculative manias and price bubbles.59 Such phenomena
undermine the notion of an efficient market driven by
investors' rational expectations, because they suggest that
stock prices frequently move far more than can possibly be
explained by changes in underlying stock values.
The trusting investor model offers an explanation for
such movements. This is because the trust model suggests that
many of the individuals who invest in corporate securities are
not paying attention to fundamental values at all. Rather,
these trusting investors are paying attention to history-to
what they have come believe is the market's intrinsic
"character." When stock prices trend upwards, trusting
investors are prone to forego independent research and to
assume that this "cooperative" institutional behavior will
continue. Their assumption may endure long past the point
where there is objective evidence to support their belief.
Recent history may offer an instructive example of this
phenomenon. During the 1990s, stock price rises that originally
reflected real increases in economic productivity became
exaggerated as investors who watched corporate earnings rise
became convinced this trend would continue, and poured more
and more money into equities. This influx of capital drove stock
prices still higher, stirring even more investor interest,
attracting even more money, driving prices still higher, until
P/E ratios-the ratio between the price investors were willing
to pay for stocks, and actual firm earnings-reached
stratospheric levels."0 Thus, investor trust may have produced a
58 SHILLER, supra note 23.
'9 See id. at 63 (describing April 1999 poll in which 72% of professional
money managers opined that the stock market was in a speculative bubble).
Id. at 8 fig. 1.2, Price-Earnings Ratio, 1881-2000 (figure showing average
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period of market history that, especially with the benefit of
hindsight, looks suspiciously like a classic example of a
speculative bubble."'
Trust may also explain why and how such a bubble can
burst. When prices fall-for almost any reason-the trust
model of investor behavior suggests that many investors may
begin to change their beliefs about the markets' "cooperative"
character. Faced with stock losses instead of gains, formerly
trusting investors lose faith. Having lost faith, they may refuse
to invest in stocks again-even when the underlying economic
problem has been solved and stocks are once more an attractive
investment. The result may be a painful, protracted, yet
fundamentally unwarranted bear market.
C. Trusting Investors and Securities Policy
This last point is important, because it hints at some of
the important policy implications that flow from the trusting
investor model. One of the more obvious of these implications is
that trusting investors matter. Rather than dismiss the
"unsophisticated investor" as the weak animal that must sadly
but necessarily be culled out of the investing herd in order to
improve the species, perhaps we should pay close attention to
his care and feeding. It may be the trusting investor who has
made it possible for the United States to develop a multi-
trillion dollar public securities market in which corporations
can annually raise hundreds of billions of dollars of new
capital.
This is not to say that there are not some investors,
especially institutional investors, who come close to conforming
to the rational expectations model of behavior. But there is
good reason to suspect that trusting investors may be the heart
and soul of the modern market. Individual investors, most of
whom hold rather small portfolios, own nearly 50% of all U.S.
corporate equities." Although institutions like mutual funds,
pension funds and insurance companies own most of the rest,
price-earnings ratio of S&P Composite Stock Index increasing from around 7-to-1 in
early 1980s, to nearly 45-to-1 in 2000).
61 See E.S. Browning, S&P 500 Follows Nasdaq to Multiyear Low, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 2002, at C1 (reporting that S&P 500 index has hit four-year low and Nasdaq
composite five-year low, even as economy seems to be in recovery).
62 See NYSE FACTBOOK, supra note 29, at 57, 61 (noting that median
portfolio value of individual investors is $28,000, mean is $149,000, and that U.S.
institutions own about 50% of U.S. corporate equities). ,
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often these institutions' investment decisions also are
influenced by individuals' views of the market: it makes little
difference if a mutual fund manager thinks her equity fund a
good investment, if individual investors do not agree.
Thus, to maintain a large and thriving public securities
market, perhaps we must pay attention to the needs of the
trusting investor. And one of the first things the trusting
investor needs, quite bluntly, is at least some degree of
government-imposed investor protection.63 This is because
trusting investors-unlike rational expectations investors-can
be fooled. They are willing to take a chance on unknown
individuals and opaque institutions. Even when they do not
know much about the securities they are buying or the extent
to which the legal system protects them, trusting investors may
be willing to "cooperate" with the market or their broker by
investing at least a modest amount in the market, just as many
experimental subjects in social dilemma games choose to
cooperate with their fellow participants and see if they
cooperate back.
A market with a significant presence of trusting
investors accordingly is a market where a con artist or
swindler, if left unsupervised, can make quite a nice living. Of
course, trust is subject to history effects-a con artist who
becomes known as a con artist will eventually run out of
unsuspecting sheep to shear. But in the meantime, he may
have collected quite a bit of wool. Abraham Lincoln is credited
with observing that "you may fool all the people some of the
time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you
can't fool all of the people all the time." 4 I would like to add a
corollary to Lincoln's Law-you can indeed fool some of the
To describe the problem in the language of law and economics, the trusting
model of investor behavior suggests that securities markets are best regulated through
tort rules rather than through property rules. See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). As a general rule, property rules
accompanied by freedom of contract allocate resources most efficiently when
transaction costs are low. When transaction costs are high, however, tort rules (which
substitute judicially-imposed damages for the price that would be set in a free market)
may be better. In the case of securities markets, high transaction costs take the form of
the immense amount of information needed to protect oneself from fraud through
contract. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 524 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed.
1980). In the same quote, Lincoln also remarked on the importance of history effects to
trust: "If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never regain
their respect and esteem." Id.
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people some of the time. For the boiler-room operator or Ponzi
schemer, that is enough to pay the rent.
Indeed, under the right circumstances, fooling some of
the people some of the time may be quite a bit more than
enough to pay the rent. This is because history effects work
both ways. An investor who loses his shirt may eventually
become as suspicious as the hypothetical rational expectations
investor of economic theory. An investor who experiences a
period of investment success, however, is likely to become more
and more trusting, and more and more vulnerable. When stock
market prices rise for exogenous reasons-say, a decrease in
commodities prices or the discovery of new productivity-
enhancing technologies-trusting investors will be inclined to
put more money into the market on the assumption that they
can expect similar price increases into the indefinite future,
without bothering to investigate whether this is, in fact, likely
to be so. The resulting association between increased
investment returns and increased investor trust may explain
why bull markets tend to be accompanied by an increase in the
incidence of securities fraud.65
This sort of history-driven increase in investor
confidence (that is, willingness to become vulnerable by
investing money) may not pose a problem when our mandatory
disclosure and antifraud systems work as they should, so that
frauds of various forms are regularly detected and punished,
and the problem of securities fraud is kept within reasonable
boundaries.66 But what happens if the regulatory system
changes? In particular, what happens if we weaken our
investor protection laws, leaving investors exposed to greater
risk of fraud?
Because the trusting investor looks more to the past
than to the future, she is likely to overlook such threats until it
is too late. Only after the horse has left does she recognize that
the barn door has been open for some time. In fact, trusting
65 See E.S. Browning, Abreast of the Market: Burst Bubbles Often Expose
Cooked Books and Trigger SEC Probes, Bankruptcy Filings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002,
at Cl; see also Wessel, supra note 19.
I use the word "may" here in recognition of the possibility that one can
have too much investor trust: if positive past returns lead investors to raise their
estimates of stock values, leading to even more positive returns, leading to even higher
prices, the phenomenon of investor trust could produce a speculative bubble in which
prices depart dramatically from rational estimates of value, with resulting distortions
in the allocation of social resources. That is a problem to be discussed another day,
however.
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investors may have already lost quite a few horses in this
fashion.
As an academic who studies corporate law and
securities regulation, I am keenly aware that over the past two
decades we have seen a variety of changes in the securities
markets, in the securities laws and in our regulatory
technology that have made it much easier for corporate
managers and securities professionals to commit fraud and
escape punishment. The list is legion, but some prominent
examples include (1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, explicitly designed to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring securities fraud class actions in federal
courts;67 (2) the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, intended to preclude plaintiffs from seeking solace in
state courts by bringing their securities fraud class actions
there;68 (3) the development and refinement in the courts of a
variety of doctrines, such as standing rules, limitations on
aiding and abetting liability, damages limitations, the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine and the "no fraud by hindsight
doctrine," all of which make it easier for courts to dismiss
securities fraud claims;6 9 (4) the evolution of a standard
practice among broker-dealers and other securities
professionals of requiring clients to sign agreements that waive
their rights to sue in court and require them to submit to
arbitration before individuals widely perceived as sympathetic
to the securities industry; ° (5) the failure of accounting
standards to keep pace with changes in the nature of modern
business, including the increasing importance of intangible
67 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Symposium,
Securities Litigation: The Fundamental Issues, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491 (1996) (discussing
1995 Act).
68 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Richard W.
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing 1998 Act).
69 Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly) Rules of Thumb In Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 118-33 (2002); Marc L. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor
Protection under the Securities Laws: Good for the Economy?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 347,
350-51 (2002).
70 See Janet E. Kerr, The Arbitration of Securities Law Disputes After
Rodriguez and the Impact on Investor Protection, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 256 (1989)
(discussing widespread practice of requiring arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Domain-
Name Arbitration in the Arbitration Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the
UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 129, 138-39 (2002) (discussing widespread
perception of pro-broker bias in securities arbitrations).
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assets and derivative contracts, with a resulting decline in the
accuracy of firms' financial statements as measures of their
financial health;71 and (6) budgetary pressures at the SEC,
where staffing levels have remained fixed for nearly a decade
while caseloads have risen by 80%.7"
These and other developments73 in the law and the
market have steadily eroded the legal protections enjoyed by
investors. A rational expectations investor would hardly be
surprised to find-indeed, would predict-that the end result of
this erosion would be an increase in the incidence of securities
fraud.74 Given the ways in which we have weakened our
regulatory system, perhaps we should be grateful that things
have not gone even more poorly for the American investor
during the past year. (Of course, there may be many more
shoes left to drop.) My point, however, is that they have gone
rather poorly, and that the American investor has suffered as a
result. She has trusted, and her trust has been abused.
Let us hope that it has not been abused too much. A
third and quite troubling lesson of the trusting investor model
is that trust that is abused tends to disappear, with no reason
to expect it to return quickly. As Mark Twain observed, a cat
that has sat on a hot stove is not going to sit on the stove again,
even when it is cold.75 You can explain to the cat that the stove
is cold until you are blue in the face-you can even disable the
stove so it will never be hot again-but no self-respecting feline
is going to go near it a second time. Similarly, history effects
may make it difficult for even the most thorough and effective
71 See Accountancy Used to Be Boring, If Only It Still Were, ECONOMIST, May
18, 2002, at 19-20 (noting that "accounting rules . .. offer plenty of opportunity for
manipulation" and that "[tihe growing use of derivatives and off-balance-sheet
financing and the rising importance of intangible assets such as brands and goodwill
have all posed challenges to traditional accounting, none of which has been resolved
entirely satisfactorily"); Mike McNamee et al., The Reluctant Reformer, BUS. WK., Mar.
25, 2002, at 72 (noting "an alarming erosion in the honesty and reliability of financial
information about companies").
72 McNamee et al., supra note 71, at 75.
"' For the reader interested in finding still more examples of how our investor
protection laws have been weakened in recent years, see Steinberg, supra note 69, at
348-51.
74 See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 711, 714-15 (1996) (arguing in 1996 that
provisions of the 1995 Act diminishing investors' ability to sue for fraud might increase
the incidence of frauds and eventually harm stock prices).
75 MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 124 (1897) ("We should be careful
to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it-and stop there; lest we be like
the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid
again-and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one any more.").
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market reforms to entice trusting investors back into the
securities market again, after they have been badly burned.
In other words, Professor Romano may be right-in the
long run."6 Trusting investors can learn to avoid putting their
money into securities markets regulated by legal regimes that
do a poor job of deterring fraud and so offer relatively low or
even negative returns. Similarly, investors can learn to prefer
other markets that give them better protection and better
returns.
But in order for the learning process to work, the legal
regime must remain stable. If the regime shifts and the rules of
the game are changed, it may take some time before investors
come to recognize the change and adjust their behavior
accordingly. Indeed, given the "noisiness" of securities markets,
the learning process may take years or even decades. As a
result, we cannot expect investor confidence to stop and turn on
a dime. Manipulating investor trust may be more like steering
an oil tanker-to change direction, one must be prepared to
wait a while before seeing any response to a turn of the wheel.
Conversely, delaying corrective action until one is sure the
tanker is headed for the rocks invites disaster.
Thus we had better be sure that our lawmakers and
policymakers are steering our markets in the correct direction.
In response to the recent wave of securities scandals,
policymakers, the press and a number of business leaders have
called for a range of regulatory reforms to shore up investor
confidence before it becomes too badly eroded.77 Unfortunately,
as of this writing most of these proposals have stalled in the
face of intense interest group lobbying, a divided Congress, and
the indifference of an administration with a strong
antiregulatory bias.78
The trusting investor model counsels against a cautious
and delayed response. If we are going to take action, it is far
better to do it too soon than too late. Despite Enron, WorldCom,
etc., the American investor still seems to have some faith in the
market. We cannot assume that faith will be unwavering. If we
adopt a "wait and see" attitude and still more frauds develop,
76 Romano, supra note 8.
77 See sources cited supra note 3.
78 See generally Amy Borrus et al., What Corporate Cleanup? As Washington
Dithers, Financial Reform Is Going Nowhere Fast, Bus. WK., June 17, 2002, at 26;
Richard S. Dunham et al., Reform Lite: In Scandal's Wake, the Government May Make
Only Modest Changes, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 30.
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the damage may already be done. Investors will lose faith and
prices will decline; this price decline will reinforce investors'
loss of faith, leading to more price declines; and so on in a self-
reinforcing downward spiral. The result may be a painful,
protracted and unnecessary bear market.
History offers some alarming examples of just such bear
markets. After the Crash of 1929, nominal stock prices did not
reach similar levels until more than twenty years later, in
1954--despite the regulatory reforms imposed by Congress in
the 1933 Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934."M Similarly, following the bear market of the mid-1970s,
nominal stock prices did not return to their 1973 high for a
decade. ° When these figures are adjusted to account for
inflation, the recovery time in each case is even longer.8
I am not convinced such prolonged bear markets are
especially bad for well-run companies. After all, even in the
best of times, such firms tend to rely upon other sources of
finance than public issues of securities (retained earnings play
an especially important role here).82 But I am convinced that
prolonged and unjustified bear markets are bad for investors-
especially those, like me, who are counting on their securities
investments to help sustain their standard of living upon
retirement.
CONCLUSION
Academic discussions of securities policy often assume
that investors are hyperrational and distrustful actors who do
not need the protections of the securities laws to avoid being
defrauded. The time has come to recognize the limitations of
this assumption and to consider as well the possibility and
'9 See RICHARD J. STILLMAN, Dow JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE: HISTORY AND
ROLE IN INVESTMENT STRATEGY app. A, fig. A-6 (1986) (showing that Dow Jones
Industrial Average, which peaked at 381 in September of 1929, did not reach similar
level until November of 1954).
80 Id. (showing that Dow Jones Industrial Average, which peaked at 1051 in
January 1973, did not reach similar level until November of 1982).
81 See SHILLER, supra note 23, at 9-10 (noting that the inflation-adjusted S&P
Composite Index did not return to its September 1929 values until December of 1958,
and that real stock prices that peaked in 1968 did not return to these levels until 1992).
82 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 6, at 384 tbl. 14.1 (showing that
internally generated funds provide the vast bulk of funds used by nonfinancial
corporations); see generally Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
613, 645-51 (1988) (discussing the unimportance of stock market prices to most firms'
abilities to raise capital).
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implications of investor trust. Experienced policymakers and
businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have
long known that trust is a potent force in explaining and
manipulating investor behavior. They are right. They are right
to believe that investor confidence-meaning investor trust-is
important to the market. They are right to think that trust has
been imperiled by the recent slew of securities frauds and
accounting scandals. Finally, they are right to call for swift and
sure action to restore investor trust.

